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ABSTRACT  
 
The background to this research is based on the considerable debate as to whether there will ever 
be one international currency, one “business” language spoken or one set of accounting 
standards applicable to all businesses listed in various countries stock exchanges. Governance 
principles are no different! Is it possible to create one set of rules or principles to guide all 
businesses across borders? This research compares the governance standards and regimes across 
the globe, from China, to the Nordic region (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland & Finland), 
Europe, Asia-Pacific (New Zealand, Australia) and the United States of America. Using archival 
data, governance codes from around the world are compared and contrasted. The findings show 
that across borders governance codes are very similar, with the opportunity to create a Global 
Governance Standard (GGS), applicable to any business in any country. The Global Governance 
Standard (GGS) is a one-size-fits-all regime applicable to businesses listing on stock exchanges. 
The GGS is not unlike the harmonisation of accounting standards. The “one-size-fits-all” GGS 
could potentially apply to any large business, listed on any stock exchange, creating efficiencies 
and ease of comparison for potential stakeholders interested in businesses. The “BOARDSS” 
model can be used by listed companies, in order to satisfy corporate governance codes from 
across the globe. Board: to ensure the board are selected carefully. Open: The make sure that the 
board is transparent and accountable. Auditor Independence: ensure accounts are audited by an 
independent auditor. Remuneration: the CEO and executive staff are reviewed, and supported 
by a smaller remuneration committee. Directors are selected for their ability to “add-value” to 
the strategic direction of the company, and the support of the CEO. Directors’ performance 
should be reviewed annually. Reducing the labyrinth of governance codes to just one GGS would 
create a uniform approach to governance, supported by government and stock exchanges around 
the world.  A GGS would be the final evolution in the notion of governance since the codes of 
conduct of Hammurabi of 1800 BC. Let the borders be gone, and the Global Governance 
Standard (GGS) left standing as the final chapter in governance evolution. 
 
JEL Classifications: G38, M16, O16 
Keywords: Global Governance Standards, BOARDSS model, Corporate Governance. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION IN LITERATURE 
 
The World Bank defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms available to 
shareholders for influencing managers to maximize the value of shareholder’s stock 
and to fixed claimants for controlling the agency costs of equity. Likewise, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines corporate 
governance as ‘a set of relationships among management, company board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders’. Both definitions imply the principal-agent model 
of the corporation, and emphasise the importance of shareholder interest and company 
value. Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as ‘a set of 
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mechanisms to assure financiers that they will get a return on their investment’. But 
can there be a governance regime that stands up to a borderless application in this 
borderless business operating system? 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Gubernare and gubernator, the roots of ‘governance’ refer to the steering of a ship 
(Farrar, 2001). By analogy, this steersmanship is aligned to the methods of ethically 
controlling and directing the affairs of corporate entities. In the contemporary 
corporate setting the Latin steersmanship notion of an entity is akin to the idea of 
matters being shipshape.  
The issue of business governance dates as far back as 1800BC to the Code of 
Hammurabi, (Werhane, 2000) that controlled the ethics of traders and merchants. Such 
fathers of modern economic doctrine as Smith (1776) and Spencer (1862) contributed 
to the current understanding of corporate governance by defining the links between 
ethics and economics which encourage management to become accountable for their 
actions, through the use of standardised preparation of accounts, audited to satisfy 
users (especially shareholders) of the absence of fraud.  
Williston (1908) describes the modern corporation evolving from a 
relationship of government and industry surviving through a combination of capital 
and mutual co-operation. The advent of the 1800s corporation and its increase in size 
and importance is crucial to infrastructure development, and as such is a societal good. 
This reasoning is extended by Carlos and Nicholas (1988) to include the advent of the 
multinational through the nineteenth century developing from the experience and use 
of domestic and cross-border level production facilities. The UK Companies Act of 
1844 was a mechanism of   that facilitated the separation of ownership and control and 
yet intended to make managers accountable to the shareholders and investment in joint 
stock companies an acceptable risk.  
Anglo-American corporate governance is almost completely focused on the 
means of enhancing and protecting shareholders’ value (Siebens, 2002), derived from 
an increase in transactions within a framework in which  owner-managers are replaced 
by salaried managers (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988). Classical economists such as Smith 
(1776) and corporate observers such as Berle & Means (1932) perceived the dangers 
inherent in the separation of ownership (principal) and control (agent) regarding 
managers’ actions. Drawing upon their analysis of the behaviour of US corporations 
in the World War 1 period following the trust movement engineered by the robber-
barons, Berle & Means (1932) realised the growing power of the organisation, and the 
inevitable separation of managerial power between executive management and their 
diverse range of shareholders – a theme pursued in the modern setting by Jenson & 
Meckling (1976) in their discussion of the concept of the agency costs of monitoring 
the behaviour of potentially errant opportunistic managers (Clarke, Dean & Oliver, 
2003) not always acting in the best interests of their owner principles.  
Although Adam Smith did not use the term ‘corporate governance’ directly, 
he was aware of the implications. “The directors of companies, being managers of 
other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery  
frequently watch over their own” (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 1776).                                                                                                                                        
Governance steersmanship then, is necessary for corporate entities, nation 
states, associations, clubs, and societies to function legitimately and efficiently for the 
benefit of those for whose wellbeing they are argued to have been created. 
Management is concerned with organising, planning, controlling, and leading 
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organisations with limited resources to achieve goals (Robbins, Bergman, Stagg & 
Coulter, 2000).  But governance also involves the limitation of powers to control and 
direct, and regulate organisations (Tricker, 1984). 
The interest in corporate governance for corporations seems to have peeked 
over the last twenty years (Oman 2001, Lin 2001, Goswani, 2001, Malherbe & Segal 
2001, Arun & Turner, 2004). Large corporations appear to have recognised the wisdom 
of complying with the governance regimes currently in fashion. “The logic is simple: 
poor corporate governance is viewed as risky, whereas creditors and investors view 
good governance as a sign of strength in a company” (Lee, 2001, p.24). It is thus no 
surprise that the Horwarth 2004 Report (Psaros & Seamer, 2004, p.1) showed that since 
2003 the top 250 listed corporations in Australia had ticked more boxes annually to 
imply “improved disclosures in relation to code of conduct, & risk management”. 
Following this, “a good governance structure is then one that selects the most able 
managers and makes them accountable to investors” (Tirole, 2001 p.2).   
 
MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 
 
Corporate governance is the system that controls and directs organisations (Cowan, 
2004). ‘Good’, effective corporate governance ensures organisations set appropriate 
objectives, have in place systems and structures to meet these objectives, and the means 
to control and monitor their activities and managers (OECD, 2015). According to the 
OECD corporate governance is explained as follows: 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation … and lays down 
the rules and procedures for decision-making. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which the company objectives are set, and means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance.  
Corporate governance rules are required because of the nature in which 
organisations are structured. With the exception of small family operated businesses, 
the people that contribute the resources to the business (capital investors, shareholders 
or lenders) do not directly manage the business (the separation of ownership from 
operational control). The corporate governance framework is primarily concerned with 
managing this relationship (Rankin, Stanton, McGowan, Ferlauto & Tilling, 2012). 
In 1999 (later revised in 2004), the OECD developed a Corporate Governance 
Framework, consisting of six principles (see Table 1 below). These “principles are 
intended to help policy makers evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to support economic 
efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability” (OECD, 2015, p.9). These 
principles “represent a common basis that OECD member countries consider essential 
for the development of good governance practices” (OECD, 2004). Both member and 
non-member countries of the OECD were explicitly invited to use these corporate 
governance principles to improve their regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks 
(Tsui, 2010).  
 
 
TABLE 1: OECD’S SIX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
 
I Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
II The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership 
functions 
III Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries 
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IV The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
V Disclosure and transparency 
VI The responsibilities of the board 
 
Source: OECD, 2015 
 
Countries have established rules or descriptions of practices “that should be 
included in corporate governance systems” that form either recommendations or legal 
requirements. In Australia the ASX (Australian Stock Exchange) has set out 
corporate governance principles and recommendations for listed entities. However, 
the ASX recognises that there are a number of factors that differ between these 
entities including their: history, size, culture and complexity; and thus “[they] may 
legitimately adopt different governance practices” (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2014). Therefore, these principles and recommendations are not mandatory. 
 
TABLE 2: ASX’S EIGHT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Governance Principles 
1 Lay solid foundations for management and oversight. 
2 Structure and board to add value 
3 Promote ethical and responsible decision making 
4 Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
5 Make timely disclosure 
6 Respect the rights of shareholders 
7 Recognise and manage risk 
8 Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
 
Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014 
 
Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies in China sets ‘the basic 
principles for corporate governance of listed companies …, the means for the 
protection of investors’ interests and rights, the basic behaviour rules and moral 
standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members 
of listed companies” (CSRC, 2003). 
 
TABLE 3: CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR LISTED 
COMPANIES IN CHINA 
 
1 Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholder’s Meetings 
2 Chapter 2. Listed Company and its controlling shareholders 
3 Chapter 3. Directors and Board of Directors 
4 Chapter 4. The supervisors and the supervisory board 
5 Chapter 5. Performance assessments and incentive and disciplinary systems 
6 Chapter 6. Stakeholders 
7 Chapter 7. Information disclosure and Transparency 
 
Source: CSRC, 2003 
 
UK Corporate Governance Code (formally known as the combined code) 
“sets out standards of good practice in relation to board leadership and effectiveness, 
remuneration, accountability and relations with shareholders” (Financial Reporting 
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Council, 2014). It comprises broad principles and specific provisions, which listed 
companies, are required to report on in their annual report.  
 
TABLE 4: UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
 
A Section A: Leadership 
B Section B: Effectiveness 
C Section C: Accountability 
D Section D: Remuneration 
E Section E: Relations with shareholders 
 
Source: Financial Reporting Council, 2014 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley United States of America Act of 2002 is mandatory for 
all organisations. This Act “introduced major changes to the regulation of financial 
practice and corporate governance” (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 2006). 
 
TABLE 5: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
 
1. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
2. Auditor Independence 
3.Corporate Responsibility 
4.Enhanced Financial Disclosures 
5. Conflicts of Interest 
6.Commission Resources and Authority 
7.Studies and Reports 
8.Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability 
9.White-collar crime penalty enhancements 
10.Corporate tax returns 
11.Corporate Fraud and Accountability 
 
Source: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 2002 
 
In New Zealand the Securities Commission released the Corporate 
Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines (CGNZ, 2004) which are to be 
applied by entities which have an economic impact and are accountable to the public 
– clearly including listed and other issuers, state owned enterprises, community trusts 
and public sector entities. The guidelines recognise that “different types of entities can 
take different approaches to achieving consistently high standards of corporate 
governance” (CGNZ, 2004, p.3).  
 
TABLE 6: NEW ZEALAND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
 
Governance Principle Recommendation 
Principle 1 Ethical Standards 
Principle 2 Board composition and performance 
Principle 3 Board Committees 
Principle 4 Reporting and disclosure 
Principle 5 Remuneration 
Principle 6 Risk Management 
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Principle 7 Auditors 
Principle 8 Shareholder Relations 
Principle 9 Stakeholder interests 
 
Source: CGNZ, 2004 
 
The Nordic region too was also inventing their own governance regimes with each 
country initiating their own regimes as shown in table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 GOVERNANCE REGIMES OF THE NORDIC REGION 
Swedish CG 
(2005) 
Denmark CG 
(2005) 
Norway CG 
(2006) 
Iceland CG 
(2005) 
Finland CG 
(2003) 
Shareholders 
Meeting 
Shareholders CG Reporting Board of 
Directors 
General 
Meetings 
Board 
Appointment  
Stakeholders Business Audit 
committee  
Supervisory 
Board 
Board of 
Directors 
Transparency Equity and 
Dividends 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Board 
Company 
Management 
Supervisory 
Board x2 
Shareholders  Board 
Committees  
CG 
Information 
Remuneration Shares  Managing 
Director 
 Risk Manage General 
Meetings 
 Other 
Management 
 Audit Nomination Com  Compensation 
  Directors  Risk 
Management 
  Directors Work  Administration 
  Risk 
Management 
 Audit 
  Remuneration x2  Communication 
  Communication   
  Take-overs   
  Audit   
 
However, these have since been updated with Sweden issuing new codes in 
2015 and a combined “Nordic Code” in 2009 as shown in table 8. 
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TABLE 8: NORDIC AND SWEDISH GOVERNANCE CODES 
 
Nordic Corporate Governance  
(2009) 
Swedish Corporate Governance 
(2010) 
Strong general meeting powers Shareholders Meeting 
Shares with multiple voting rights Appointment and remuneration of 
Board, auditor 
Strong minority protection The tasks of the board of directors 
Effective individual shareholder rights Size and composition of the Board 
Non-executive Boards The tasks of directors 
Use of Board Committees The chair of the Board 
Auditors appointed by and accountable 
to shareholders 
Board Procedures 
Active governance role of major 
shareholders 
Evaluation of the board and CEO 
Transparency 
 
Remuneration of the Board and 
executive management 
 Information of corporate governance 
 
Source: The working group of the self-regulatory corporate governance bodies of the 
5 Nordic countries, 2009; Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2010 
 
By now comparing each of the regimes we can combine them to see the 
differences and similarities as shown in table 10. The Table shows that each of the 
regimes is a set of protective principles designed to protect the interests of absentee 
(non -management participating) shareholders. It shows a variety of combinations 
and that in itself shows the lack of consistency when designing and applying 
corporate governance initiatives.  
Also outlined are the principles in terms of their comparison of use in the 
seven different governance mechanisms. These comparisons show a variation in what 
is considered the applicable corporate governance mechanisms in different countries 
and regions, for different organisations. It is interesting to note that SOX appears to be 
centred on penalties to prevent fraud, whereas the ASXGCG is the only organisation 
to mention risk and ethics. This is more likely a reflection of the current differences in 
the huge amount of litigation occurring in the US, and the Australian attempt to prevent 
litigation by introducing risk management and ethics. 
 
TABLE 9: COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS 
 
Regimes of 
‘protective’ 
Principles 
China Nordic 
Regions 
New 
Zealand 
OECD US UK AUS 
Governance 
Framework 
       
Shareholder 
Importance 
x3 x3   x 2    
Disclosure & 
Transparency 
       x 2 
Board’s 
Responsibilities  
       
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Directors’ 
Performance 
       
Remuneration        
Auditor 
Independence 
       
Conflicts of 
Interest 
       
Company 
Oversight Board 
       
Corporate Fraud        
Penalties & 
Sentencing 
       
Ethical 
Decisions 
       
Risk 
Management 
       
Stakeholders        
 
 
Arguably, the analysis in Table 9 suggests that a case can be mounted to the effect 
that of the regimes listed, 7 prove to be the most popular and useful being: Shareholder 
Importance, Disclosure and transparency, Board Responsibilities, Directors 
performance, Remuneration, Auditor Independence & Stakeholders. We can then 
convert these into 7 global standards and use the acronym “BOARDSS”, creating the 
governance standard shown in figure 1: 
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FIGURE 1: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STANDARDS (GGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board: to ensure the board are selected carefully (nomination committee), that they possess the right skills, education,  
experience, be cultural and diverse. 
Open: The make sure that the board is transparent, accountable and disclosure accurately and in a timely manner. 
Auditor Independence: that accounts are audited by an independent auditor. 
Remuneration of directors, the CEO and executive staff are reviewed, and supported by a smaller remuneration  
committee to the satisfaction of shareholders. 
Directors are selected for their ability to “add-value” to the strategic direction of the company, and the support of the  
CEO. Directors performance should be reviewed annually and training and support provided to up-skill directors and  
assist them to guide the company to success. 
Shareholders: to be given importance (both majority and minority), that shareholders have a voice (vote) and are provided 
timely and accurate information on the company whereas the other ‘Stakeholders’ should be managed in line with company 
policy, in an ethical manner as part of risk minimization for the company. 
Shareholders 
and 
Stakeholders 
Directors Board Open 
Auditor 
Independence 
Remuneration 
Global Governance 
Standards (GGS) 
(BOARDSS) 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
There is much debate as to whether there will ever be one set of governance standards 
applicable to all businesses listed in various countries stock exchanges. This research 
compares the governance standards across the globe, from China, to the Nordic region, 
Europe, Asia-Pacific and the United States of America. The findings show that across 
borders governance codes are very similar, but they have differences. This does not 
diminish the need, indeed the ability, to capture the most common features of each to 
create a Global Governance Standard (GGS), applicable to any business in all 
countries. It could be known by the acronym BOARDSS (Board, Open, Auditor, 
Remuneration, Directors, Shareholders and Stakeholder). Such a “one-size-fits-all” 
GGS could potentially apply to any company listed on any stock exchange.  
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